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Abstract 
 
How does the sovereign credit ratings history provided by independent ratings agencies affect 
domestic financial sector development and international capital inflows to emerging 
countries? We address this question utilizing a comprehensive dataset of sovereign credit 
ratings from Standard and Poor’s from 1995-2003 for a cross-section of 51 emerging markets. 
Within a panel data estimation framework, we examine financial sector development and the 
influence of sovereign credit ratings provision, controlling for various economic and 
corporate governance factors identified in the financial development literature. We find strong 
evidence that our sovereign credit rating measures do affect financial intermediary sector 
developments and capital flows. We find that i) long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings are important for encouraging financial intermediary development and for attracting 
capital flows. ii) Long-term local currency ratings stimulate domestic market growth but 
discourage international capital flows. iii) Short-term ratings (both foreign and local currency 
denominated) retard all forms of financial developments and capital flows. There are 
important implications in this research for policy makers to encourage the provision of longer-
term credit ratings to promote financial development in emerging economies.  
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1. Introduction 
Financial crises in the past decade have drawn a great debate about the role of financial flows 
in emerging market economies. It is generally believed that improving a country’s 
transparency, information control, financing costs and sovereign risk levels is expected to 
increase international capital inflows and improve the general level of development in 
financial markets and their financial integration with world capital markets. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) find that the flows of capital from developed to emerging countries are 
influenced by, among other factors, sovereign default risk, which is typically measured by 
sovereign credit ratings. Whilst episodes of financial crises have shown that these ratings fail 
in predicting sudden changes within emerging markets we hypothesize that they have 
significant information value to improve institutional quality for facilitating long-run financial 
and economic development. To our best knowledge, this has not been investigated to date. 
Accordingly, our primary contribution is to fill this surprising void and investigate the 
influence of sovereign ratings on the development of financial intermediary sectors in 
emerging markets and on the nature of international capital inflows. 
 Previous studies have found sovereign credit ratings across countries to encapsulate 
various fundamental aspects of a country’s debt history and macroeconomic strength such as 
the amount of debt outstanding, GDP per capita, economic growth, inflation and debt 
repayment ability (see inter alia Cantor and Packer, 1996; Afonso, 2003; and Mora, 2006). As 
such, sovereign credit ratings are deemed to be a reference measure of country risk. Much of 
the literature has focused on its short-term information (predictive) content for financial 
market returns, interdependence and crises (see for example, Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999; 
Brooks et al., 2004; Mora, 2006; Gande and Parsley, 2005; and Ferreira and Gama, 2007). It 
is conceivable that there are many risk factors simultaneously influencing a country’s credit 
rating including political and other expropriation risk, inflation, exchange rate volatility and 
controls, the country’s industry composition, economic viability and sensitivity to global 
economic shocks. This arguably makes sovereign credit ratings a good proxy for the degree of 
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transparency and future country risk.1 In support of this view, Erb, Harvey and Viskanta 
(1999) find a high correlation between the country credit ratings and the sovereign bond yield 
spreads of emerging markets.  
 Financial development is important for financial intermediation and the efficient 
allocation of capital within global economies. It is clearly a crucial element to the overall 
economic development of emerging capital markets. The extent to which financial 
intermediation is developed and proceeds in emerging capital markets is often hampered by 
domestic political tensions or a lack of macroeconomic and government transparency. There 
exists a well-established literature assessing financial development, the bank or market 
orientation of financial systems and particularly their promotion of economic development 
and growth at the aggregate, industry and firm level (see inter alia Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990;, King and Levine, 1993;, Levine, 1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998;, Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Beck et al., 2000; Carlin and Mayer, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Fisman and 
Love, 2004; and Ndikumana, 2005). In this vein, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) 
show a positive link between financial development and firms’ access to external finance and 
Wurgler (2000) highlights financial development and capital allocation efficiency.  
 Motivated by its key role in economic development, there is also a burgeoning 
literature on the determinants of financial development – covering institutional, economic, 
political, religious, cultural and legal domains (La Porta et al. (1999), Beck et al. (2000), Stulz 
and Williamson (2003), Claessens and Laeven (2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003), and Chinn 
and Ito (2006)). This literature has largely focused on stock market developments. Little is 
known about the precursory developments of public and private debt sectors in the broader 
evolution from bank-based to market based financial structures in emerging economies. Thus, 
we address this deficiency in the existing literature by examining the extent to which the 
observed differences in development levels within different domestic financial intermediary 
sectors can be accounted for by an obvious but so far overlooked candidate that encapsulates 
various existing explanations, namely the sovereign credit ratings history provided by rating 
                                                 
1 In a similar spirit, Morgan (2002) in studying banking industries interpreted a greater dispersion of bond ratings 
as greater opaqueness of banks. 
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agencies. The advantage of studying sovereign credit ratings is that sovereigns and their 
primary influences on a country’s institutions and policies are central to the foundations of 
financial market and economic development. In effect, we explore the relationships between 
the development in different forms of financial intermediation and a country’s perceived 
willingness and ability to repay its debts, on which financial stability depends. This is 
important not only because international lenders often look to sovereigns to provide implicit 
or explicit payment guarantees to private borrowers and the sovereigns’ financial positions in 
both local and foreign currencies play a crucial role in this regard, but also, private debt 
issuers’ credit rating is bounded from above by their respective country’s sovereign ratings. 
 Bank-based financial intermediation continues to dominate public security markets, if 
present, in emerging market finance but financial systems have a tendency to become more 
market based as economies develop. It is conceivable that the extent to which different 
financial sectors are developed differ across countries. The national differences in financial 
sector developments pose a useful framework for assessing how independent rating agencies 
may influence financial development and at the same time, financial flows to emerging 
markets – a key requirement for stable financial systems. An emerging market’s domestic 
financial development and international capital flows are inexplicably intertwined so it is 
important to examine the influence of sovereign ratings on both aspects in this study. 
 We proceed to construct multiple measures of domestic financial sector development 
to capture and better understand how different aspects of the emerging financial system are 
affected. We seek to shed light on the elements of financial underdevelopment in emerging 
financial markets, where independent ratings agencies may help. In addition, we examine the 
influence of the ratings on attracting international capital and thus domestic financial sector 
development. Unlike the majority of existing studies looking at a combination of developed 
and developing countries, we focus exclusively on emerging markets to minimize the 
variation in financial structure and corporate governance standards which may mask 
underlying relationships. We utilize a panel data framework with 51 emerging market 
countries and 9 years over the period 1995-2003 to examine the channels through which 
different types of sovereign credit ratings (on long- and short-term and local and foreign 
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currency denominated sovereign debts2) may affect financial development and international 
capital flows (international banking, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows).  
 We find strong evidence that our ratings measures affect financial sector developments 
and international capital flows. The specific findings are summarized as follows. i) Foreign 
currency long-term ratings proved to be the most important stimulus for international capital 
flows. All three forms of capital inflows (FDI, banking and portfolio) were significantly 
increased as foreign currency long-term ratings of emerging market sovereigns improved. A 
flow on effect on the domestic market development is felt most noticeably in the bond market 
sector where a significant positive association is found. In addition, there is some evidence 
that long-term foreign currency ratings contribute to changes in financial structure as it creates 
a trade- off between developments of the stock market on the one hand and the banking sector 
and the bond markets on the other.   
 ii) Local currency long-term ratings provide conflicting influences on international 
capital flows and domestic financial sector developments. On the one hand, they stimulated 
the developments of domestic stock and banking sectors, but they had detrimental impact on 
international capital flows. We argue that many emerging market sovereigns provide safety 
nets for financial sectors (e.g. lenders of last resort in the banking sector and management of 
market stabilization funds in stock and bond markets) and an improvement in sovereigns’ 
local currency fiscal positions adds to market stability and hence a stimulus to market growth. 
However, as domestic markets develop more domestic currency funds would be supplied and 
this reduces sovereigns’ reliance on foreign currency capital in financing domestic currency 
expenditures, thus lessening the impact of ‘original sin’. 
 iii) We find detrimental impacts of short-term ratings in both foreign and domestic 
currency ratings. Improvements in short-term ratings, in general, deter international capital 
inflows and hamper domestic financial market developments. We argue that an improvement 
in short-term ratings encourages sovereigns to switch from long-term financing to short-term 
financing which potentially raises liquidity risks, leading to a deterioration in capital inflows 
                                                 
2 Local and foreign currency sovereign credit ratings are largely based on the same factors but the latter gives 
more focus to balance of payments, political risk, economic policies and global integration and reflects a 
country’s capacity to meet debt obligations denominated in foreign currency terms (see Brooks et al. (2004)). 
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and long-term financial development potentials. The obvious implication of this finding is for 
emerging market policy makers to encourage the provision of public credit ratings for long-
term debt denominated in both domestic and foreign currencies.  
 Thus, we make important policy contributions particularly given the recent spotlight 
shone on independent credit rating agencies to provide credit risk ratings for financial 
institutions and economies as part of the Basle II accord. This study is also relevant for the 
international investment community relying on credit ratings guidance in their financial 
decision making. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will set up the 
theoretical motivations for this study. Section 3 will discuss the data used and relevant 
modeling issues are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 will document the empirical results and 
conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical motivations  
 
One of the key functions of financial sectors in emerging financial systems is the matching of 
savers (investors) and borrowers (security issuers) within a capital market. The hallmarks of a 
developed financial system include an effective legal system that enforces the protection for 
property rights and financial contracting; transparent accounting and disclosure systems; a 
good reputation for sound policymaking (supportive of financial markets and their 
development) and macroeconomic management; and adequate regulatory infrastructure and 
institutional quality (see inter alia, LaPorta et al., 1997, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; Carlin and 
Mayer, 2003; and Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Since credit ratings naturally encapsulate some 
of the powerful incentives for financial development and are likely to influence financial 
decisions, it is important to investigate whether independent sovereign credit ratings can 
(either directly or indirectly) influence how different financial sectors carry out the resource 
allocation function. We question whether different types of credit ratings guidance (foreign 
vs. local currency, long-term vs. short-term nature) will have different effects on development 
in different sectors (banking, bonds and equity).  
 7 
Existing theories relating to financial structure and economic development, postulate 
the relevance of information disclosure to the effective provision of finance. Boyd and Smith 
(1998) argued theoretically that since capital is scarce in developing economies, monitoring 
costs should be low relative to the cost of capital. Therefore, bank finance being intensive in 
monitoring, is preferable in the early stages of economic development. In this vein, credit 
ratings can directly reduce monitoring costs3 and encourage financial development further. It 
can also work to stimulate capital inflows and indirectly reduce the cost of capital in emerging 
economies. 
 In the existing literature, Rajan and Zingales (2003) highlight demand as “a prime 
driver of financial development” and sovereign credit ratings can also indirectly boost 
demand through the signaling of improved transparency, country risk levels and investor 
protection. As Rajan and Zingales’ (2003) ‘private interest group theory’ of financial 
development predicts that incumbents’ incentive to oppose financial development will be 
weaker when a country allows both cross-border trade and capital flows, we interpret that 
sovereign credit ratings can also provide a mechanism to discourage financially repressive 
sovereign regimes. In this view, we extend the links known between cross-border transactions 
and financial market developments from Chinn and Ito (2006) and Bekaert et. al. (2007). 
 Hence in testing the economic values of different types of sovereign credit ratings, we 
proceed with our assessment of sovereign ratings on three levels: firstly, on the financial 
intermediary sector development level; secondly, on the aggregate capital flow level.  As 
Gande and Parsley (2005) highlight “financial flows are now the dominant vehicle of 
interdependence” (p.692), so by examining the influence of credit ratings on capital flows as 
part of our analyses, we are contributing to a better understanding of the determinants of 
capital flows into emerging markets and their interdependence with global financial markets. 
In this research design, we examine the implications of credit ratings provision for both 
financial development and aspects of financial integration in emerging market economies.  
 
                                                 
3 See Boot et al. (2005) for a theoretical discussion on how credit ratings can serve as  ‘focal points’ in financial 
markets and help to reduce financial fragility.  
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3. Data descriptions and modelling issues 
3.1 Sovereign ratings 
We consider sovereign credit ratings produced by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) on a total of 51 
emerging market countries in four regional groupings – Asia, Latin America, Emerging 
Europe and Africa/Middle East for the period 1995 to 2003 (see Appendix B for country 
list)4. S&P’s sovereign ratings include long-term ratings and their outlooks for the six months 
hence and short-term ratings for both foreign currency and local currency denominated debt. 
The long-term ratings range from AAA (highest credit quality) to D/SD (default/selective 
default) and these ratings are attached with rating outlook that varies from Credit Watch – 
Positive to Credit Watch – Negative. The ratings of BBB- and above are considered 
investment grade and the ratings BB+ and below are considered speculative. The short-term 
ratings vary from A-1+ to D/SD. The investment grade is A-3 and above. The ratings 
announcements are irregularly spaced and by nature are made only when there are sufficient 
changes in underlying economic and financial conditions that warrant changes in the credit 
quality of sovereigns. For instance, out of a total of 15 ratings changes announced for 
Argentina over the period, 8 were made in 2001 alone (Argentine debt crisis). 
The S&P’s ratings are linearly transformed into a time series for each of the countries 
in two stages, similar to Gande and Parsley’s (2005) construction of their comprehensive 
sovereign credit measure.5 First, we assign numerical values for each of the rating grade 
ranging from 0 for default to 20 for AAA for the long-term ratings and 7 for the top short-
term ratings. Appendix A shows the numerical conversion of the ratings to operationalize 
statistical analyses. The long-term ratings are adjusted to include the outlook associated with 
each rating. That is, the long-term ratings series is the sum of long-term rating plus ratings 
outlook. For instance, if a country’s average rating for a year was AA (18) and the associated 
                                                 
4 We also considered equivalent ratings produced by Moodys and Fitch. They produced ratings for fewer 
sovereigns and at less frequent intervals than S&P with largely consistent assessments. It has also been 
documented in the sovereign credit ratings literature that S&P tends to lead other agencies and are more active 
(see Brooks et al., 2004; and Gande and Parsley, 2005).Thus, we chose to concentrate on the S&P ratings alone. 
5  In a different line of investigation, Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama (2007) use the 
comprehensive credit ratings measure to examine the spillover effects of one country’s sovereign credit rating 
events to other countries’ sovereign debt markets and stock markets respectively. 
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outlook was Positive (0.25), the overall long-term rating would take the value of 18.25.  
Second, we calculate the annual average rating for each of the 51 sample countries for the 
period 1995 to 2003. We first generate four daily time series of ratings (long and short-term 
for foreign and local currency denominated debt) by assigning the announced ratings values to 
the days between their announcements and the dates of next ratings events. For instance, 
Argentina’s long-term foreign currency rating was changed from CCC+ with negative outlook 
to CC with negative outlook on 30 October 2001, and then to SD on 6 November 2001. We 
assign the value of 0.75 (the sum of 1 for the CC and -0.25 for the negative outlook) for the 
days between 30 October 2001 and 5 November 2001, and 0 (the value for SD) for 6 
November 2001 and beyond. The daily ratings series are then used to calculate annual average 
ratings for each of the 51 countries. Similar conversions are made for the short-term ratings. 
 
3.2 Financial market variables 
We investigate the role of sovereign ratings on various measures of financial market 
developments in emerging market countries. To compute various indicators of financial sector 
development for emerging countries, data was sourced from the World Bank Development 
Indicators database (WDI), and the World Bank’s Financial Structure and Development 
Database associated with Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000). 6 Our sample is from 
1995-2003 for our 51 emerging countries. 
We consider three segments of the financial system – equity, banking and debt 
markets – to provide different perspectives of financial development. Within each of the three 
segments we examine a number of alternative measures of market development. For the stock 
market, we examine the amount of stock traded measured in value as a percentage of GDP 
and as turnover ratios and also market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. For the banking 
sector development measures, we examine the amounts of private credit (loans) by deposit 
money banks and total amount of domestic credit provided by banking sector both as a 
                                                 
6 This database has since been updated to 2004 for most countries. 
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percentage of GDP. The debt market measures include private and public bond market 
capitalization as a proportion to GDP.  
 
3.3 Control variables 
The country economic controls are independent variables that are customarily used in cross-
country financial development studies that we include to reduce model misspecification errors 
from the omission of important variables. In our study they also help with evaluating the 
incremental effects of credit ratings provided by independent rating agencies. The data used 
for these variables are provided in Appendix C and are discussed further as part of the 
empirical model. 
We recognize that there is likely to be an endogenous relationship between credit 
ratings and financial development as with improvements in development will come about 
better credit ratings. We mitigate the confounding effects of this possibility in our panel 
estimation framework first by using the initial levels of financial development in each 
intermediary sector and type of capital flow (proxied by a lag of the dependant variable) to 
indirectly capture all other precursory influences on financial development. 
 We also control for various governance issues that may arise during the process of 
financial development and impact upon international capital flows. We employ the aggregate 
worldwide governance indicators made available by the World Bank which are designed to 
measure six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The 
details of the construction of these measures are to be found in Kauffman et al. (2005). This is 
one of the most comprehensive compilations of data on governance currently available. 
  
3.4 International financial flows 
We also investigate the role of sovereign credit ratings on international capital flows to 
emerging market countries. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are measured by net 
inflows as a percentage of GDP and by the log of net inflows as a part of the balance of 
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payment in current US Dollars. International banking flows are measured as the net asset of 
all Bank for International Settlement (BIS) reporting banks against the emerging market 
countries under examination, and as net loan granted to the latter by the former. Both are 
measured in US$ billions. Lastly, we examine two measures of portfolio investment flows – 
bond and equity market investment inflows both measured in US$ billions. The FDI and 
portfolio flows data were obtained from the World Bank WDI database and the international 
banking flow data were sourced from the BIS. 
 
4. Empirical model 
 
The series of panel estimations that we conduct are shown in the model below: 
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Where FINDEV are the three financial market development measures for country i and year t 
(j = stock market, banking sector and bond market, see Appendix A for details on their 
respective proxies) and CAPFLOW are the international capital flows variables (j = FDI, bank 
and portfolio flows) grouped by country, yielding a potential 459 (= 51 times 9) observations. 
The ratings variables we employ are foreign currency ratings for long- and short-term 
sovereign debt issues (FCLT and FCST), and local currency sovereign debt for long (LCLT) 
and short-term (LCST). The long-term ratings variable varies between 20 (highest quality) 
and 0 (current default), whereas the short-term rating take the values between 7 (highest 
quality) to 0 (current default). 
We anticipate that, in general, the sovereign credit rating variables (both in local and 
foreign currencies) should have a positive influence (i.e. positive ratings coefficients) on the 
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financial market developments and capital inflows. This is because of the important 
leadership role governments play in the early stages of market development in many emerging 
market countries. In some circumstances, governments’ fiscal positions can play a crucial role 
in providing various financial and non-financial safety nets to companies that are considered 
to be of some national significance. As such, governments’ fiscal positions would then be 
seen as one of the indicators of market development potential. In the same spirit, we expect a 
generally positive influence of high ratings on international capital flows for similar reasons.  
A typical feature of emerging markets is a lack of an external financial market in their 
own currencies leading to the situation of ‘original sin’ where countries are forced to borrow 
in hard currencies to finance domestic developments due to insufficient domestic savings7. In 
such a circumstance sovereign credit rating in foreign currencies would play a crucial role in 
determining to what extent external financing of domestic economic development is 
facilitated through this channel. Sovereigns are capable of generating local currency funds via 
issuance of securities or taxation and so default is thought to be unlikely. However, to the 
extent that some sovereigns have shown tendencies to monetize their national debt leading to 
inflationary pressures, domestic currency credit ratings would reflect this inflation risk among 
others. Thus, local currency ratings maybe regarded as a proxy for such an inflation risk rather 
than sovereign’s default risk. 
 As for short- and long-term ratings, they may convey different risks, liquidity and 
inflation/default, respectively.  
Depending on the types of market development measures, international capital flows, 
and specific ratings variables considered, we expect some degree of heterogeneity in 
responses to the ratings variables. In summary, the sign of the coefficient on credit rating 
history is expected a priori to have a positive sign. We are interested in the differences in 
magnitude and significance across financial sectors.   
The control variables (CONTROLS) employed in the panel regressions varied 
depending on the financial sector development measures considered and the nature of 
                                                 
7 For more detailed discussion on the idea of original sin, see Eichengreen et al (2002) and McKinnon and 
Schnabl (2004). 
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international capital flows. It needs to be pointed out at the outset that there is potentially a 
long list of economic and financial market variables that could potentially help explain the 
variables of interest. We narrow the list by firstly considering those control variables that 
would be of direct relevance to each of the dependant variables as suggested by the literature 
and then eliminating those that turned out to be insignificant. 
For the stock market development measures, we first considered the following control 
variables – real GDP growth rates, annual percentage change in S&P/IFC’s investible index, 
and annual consumer price inflation rate. For the banking sector development measures, we 
employed interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate) and the ratio of bank liquid 
reserves to bank assets. For the bond market, we utilized the consumer inflation rate, gross 
fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP and log of national income. Log of income 
was included as it is well accepted in the literature that economic structures become more 
complex and financial systems deepen with rising income levels. The inflation rate is included 
as it affects real rates of return and is associated with inflation uncertainty. This may distort 
financial decision-making and discourage financial intermediation. 
In the international capital flows estimations, we use the share (percentage) of 
international trade to GDP (economic openness) and stock market capitalization as a 
proportion of GDP (financial market development) for all three types of international flows. 
In addition, we employ log of national income for the FDI and banking flows, domestic credit 
provided by banking sector (% of GDP) for the banking and portfolio flows, and GDP growth 
rate for the portfolio flows. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Financial sector development with sovereign credit ratings 
The fixed effects estimations allowing for both individual country and time effects of 
model (1) are presented in Table 18. The results suggest that the sovereign credit ratings 
                                                 
8 In some cases, the random effects estimation was shown to be more appropriate according to the Hausman test. 
However, the resulting random effects estimations produced qualitatively the same results as the fixed effects 
estimations reported in Table 1 for consistency.   
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measures have significant influences on financial sector developments. We find that different 
measures for individual financial sectors are not always influenced by credit ratings in the 
same manner as they do capture different aspects of financial development in the three broad 
financial intermediary sectors. In general, each of the financial market development models 
performs very well. Total variations of development measures explained vary from the low of 
58% to the high of 98%. There is no evidence for a panel unit root in any of the dependant 
variables. 
We recognize that the willingness of investors to hold sovereign debt captured by a 
steady provision of relevant credit ratings by independent rating agencies may induce an 
upward bias into our estimation results. However, credit ratings are clearly also signals for 
financial decision-making and credit rating agencies also serve a monitoring role as shown by 
Boot et al. (2006).  
 Foreign currency long-term ratings show expected positive influence in general, and it 
is statistically significant for bond market developments. Both private and public bond market 
capitalization increased with ratings improvements. As sovereign ratings generally act as 
ceilings for private bond issuers in their foreign currency bond issues, high quality issuers 
would obtain ratings only as good as their sovereign. To the extent that an elevation in foreign 
currency ratings would relax this constraint, it provides a further boost to private bond market 
development. It is shown that a greater impact is exerted on the public bond market. There is 
no evidence of sovereign ratings’ influence on banking sector developments. In the stock 
market, there is a strong negative relationship between market turnover and foreign currency 
long-term ratings. This might represent a shift of market activities away from the stock market 
towards banking and bond sectors as the ratings improve.  Foreign currency short-term ratings 
are significant only for private bond market capitalization and the negative coefficient 
suggests a significant drop in market capitalization in relation to ratings upgrades. It suggests 
a switch from long-term to short-term foreign currency financing occurs as short-term ratings 
improve given long-term ratings.     
For the long term local currency ratings, with the exception of the bond markets, 
positive impact is shown in all cases. A significant rise in stock market turnover and two 
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measures of bank lending (private credit and BLENDING) is shown in response to an 
improvement in the long-term ratings. Interestingly, bond markets reacted negatively to a 
rating improvement and this suggests a lack of development in the domestic currency 
denominated bond market in emerging economies, consistent with the well-known ‘original 
sin’ phenomenon. In conjunction with a positive influence of foreign currency long-term 
ratings discussed above, emerging markets show limited domestic bond market development 
from within relying instead on an improvement in foreign currency ratings to stimulate 
externally sourced market growth. This argument is reinforced in the international portfolio 
flow estimations presented in Table 3. 
The short-term local currency ratings consistently deter market development in all 
financial sectors as information from short-term domestic currency ratings work to induce 
uncertainty and discourage financial intermediation in the economy. This corroborates with 
Dellas and Hess (2005)’s finding that financial development is significantly related to the 
behavior of the second moments of stock return distributions. We also find that the private 
bond sector is the most sensitive to sovereign credit ratings and its development can be 
hampered by all types of sovereign credit ratings except long-term foreign currency ones. 
Taken together, our findings suggest that credit ratings do have long-term information content 
or signaling effect for encouraging financial development across all financial sectors. 
As expected, financial sector development is a persistent process with previous levels 
of own development measures having significantly positive effects on market development 
over time in all cases. However, as is indicated by the panel unit root test statistics reported in 
the last section of Table 1, there is no evidence of either a common or an individual unit root. 
The aggregate governance measures have diverse influences on the financial 
development measures in banking and bond markets. In general, stock market measures are 
insensitive to the governance measures whilst banking sector development is the most 
sensitive. For banking sector development, the government effectiveness measure had the 
expected positive influence on two of the three banking sector development measures. 
Considering the dominant role governments play in the banking sector in many emerging 
market economies (via government ownership, policy loan directives, moral suasion, etc.), 
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government effectiveness is indeed crucial for banking sector development. This is certainly 
paramount in the initial stages of financial sector development when bank finance dominates 
other forms of finance for corporations. Interestingly, political stability and regulation quality 
measures had a negative influence. This may suggest that as these measures deteriorate, there 
is a significantly greater reliance on the banking sector over the other market-based segments 
(i.e. bond and stock markets). In the bond markets, there is an interesting contrast between 
private and public bond market responses to rule of law and corruption measures. Naturally, 
investors’ confidence in the control of corruption is essential for private debt to flourish and 
poor control enables the misuse of public power for private gains and hence, the reliance on 
government debt. Still, the rule of law is important for public debt as investors will evidently 
choose to deal with private borrowers if they have little confidence in the legal system. 
Our economic control variables are also significant as in previous studies on financial 
development. We find that economic growth encourages the trading of stocks, but not bond 
market nor banking sector development. Similarly, there appears to be a negative relationship 
between gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and bond market development measures. This 
can be explained by our observation that debt markets and banking sectors are either non-
existent or at very early stages of development in emerging economies that have little or no 
growth and/or capital investments (low economic development) whereas higher levels of 
economic growth are associated with emerging markets with more advanced financial 
systems. However, log of income per capita (LOGINC, as a proxy for national wealth) is 
important for kick starting the development of private bond markets in emerging economies. 
Inflation significantly detracts from the development of public bond markets and this is 
consistent with its ambiguous effects on stocks and negative impact on bond expected returns 
in the asset pricing literature (see Campbell and Ammer, 1993). Banking sectors in emerging 
markets are immune from the effects of inflation 9 and are only affected by interest rate 
spreads and liquid reserves to asset ratios. Lower interest rate spreads (between lending and 
borrowing rates) are more conducive for banking sector development as they are intuitively 
                                                 
9 This result was revealed in non-reported estimations that are available upon request from the corresponding 
author. There is empirical literature to suggest that inflation in emerging markets actually improves banks’ 
profits through increased financial transactions in the economy. 
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associated with more competitive banking industries. Similarly, lower liquid reserves to asset 
ratios significantly encourage banking developments (proxied by banking credit) because 
banks are able to operate with higher efficiency.   
Growth in investibility (INVEST, based on S&P’s Investible Index), is a measure of 
the increasing degree to which stocks can be foreign owned within an emerging market. We 
find that this is clearly important for stock market development and this is consistent with De 
Jong and De Roon’s (2005) and Bae, Chan and Ng’s (2004) inferences on increasing financial 
market integration with world capital markets. 
 
5.2 Robustness checks of financial sector development estimations 
We provide a summary of alternative estimations of model (1) in Table 2. The top panel 
reports the ratings variable coefficients when they are estimated with a one period lag. This is 
to address the potential problems of endogeniety between the financial development measures 
and the ratings variables10. Although, some coefficients lose significance, an overall picture of 
the role of the rating variables discussed above remains intact. In the lower panel of Table 2, 
we report the ratings variable coefficients when they are estimated individually. That is each 
of the four ratings variables are estimated one at a time in Model (1) and the resulting 
coefficients are reported. This is to address the potential for multicollinearity amongst the 
ratings variables. Once again, the qualitative results of the estimations are the same as before. 
Thus, the results reported in Table 1 seem to be free from endogeneity and multicollinearity 
concerns and are robust to different model specifications.  
 
5.3. International capital flows with sovereign credit ratings 
Furthering our linkage of credit ratings provision to financial openness and financial 
development, we investigate the influence of credit ratings on different types of capital flows 
                                                 
10 The ratings variables often do not change over a number of years and when they do the average value during 
any given year is used as the ratings value for that year. As such, they are more or less pre-determined to the 
dependent variables and so endogeneity may not be an issue. This is confirmed by the estimations using the one 
period lag of the ratings variables. 
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into emerging markets, namely, foreign direct investment, international banking flows and 
portfolio flows. The panel regression results are shown in Table 3 11 . In short, we find 
heterogeneous influences of various rating types on different capital flows. Both the FDI and 
banking flows’ models perform well in explaining the variations of the dependent variables 
used. The adjusted R squares range from 54% to 86%. However, the portfolio flow models’ 
overall performance is lower with the R squares hovering around 30%. As before, there is no 
evidence of panel unit root in any of the dependant variables. 
 Long-term foreign currency ratings have the expected positive influences on all three 
types of capital inflows and each type reveals at least one significant association. This 
suggests that we can attribute the role of foreign currency ratings in financial development on 
their long-term contribution to encouraging all three types of capital flows. On the other hand, 
short-term foreign currency ratings have a significant dampening effect on the two forms of 
FDI flows. It appears that an improvement in short-term ratings improves access and 
encourages emerging sovereigns to concentrate on the short-term end in their international 
financing needs, thus crowding out long-term financial market activities in the form of FDI.  
 Local currency ratings, both long- and short-term, are in general, detrimental to all 
three forms of capital inflows. This suggests that to some extent emerging market countries 
rely on foreign credits for domestic financing needs and improvements in local currency 
ratings encourages them to switch to domestic currency financing. A lone exception is a 
positive influence of short-term rating on portfolio equity flows. 
The World Bank governance indices have mixed influences on the capital flow 
measures depending on the types of indices and capital flows. The FDI flows responded 
                                                 
11 Warnock (2002) suggests that capital flows data have limitations as they are “…designed according to the 
conventions of balance of payment accounting, they capture only the country of the foreign intermediary, which 
is not necessarily the country of origin”.  Despite this, lack of stock data available for foreign capital holdings 
generally prevents alternative investigations. There is, however, some limited availability of stock data on 
foreign capital holdings in the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). It covers the period, 1997 
and 2001-2005 for total portfolio investment, equity investment, total debt, long term and short-term debt 
holdings of foreigners on a number of countries. Hence, we also estimated model 2 with these five foreign 
capital stock variables against the 51 countries over the period 2001-2003 (consistent with the ratings data 
period) and  the results are qualitatively similar to that reported in Table 3. This indicates that our use of capital 
flow data provides a fairly accurate picture of rating effects on cross-border investments. Interested readers may 
obtain the additional estimation results from the corresponding author. 
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positively to the rule of law and control of corruption suggesting that transparency in terms of 
the rules governing business and rare abuses of public power for private interest groups 
significantly encourages international FDI flows. However, there is some evidence of more 
FDI flows in response to deteriorating voice and accountability and government effectiveness. 
This suggests that the lack of civil liberty and public services provision may be viewed by 
multinationals as opportunities for profitable foreign investment rather than deterrents. In 
contrast, the banking flows were positively influenced by improved voice and accountability 
and government effectiveness which benefits local citizens. Not surprisingly, banking flows 
appear to pick up when there is a decline in the ability of governments to form or implement 
regulations and policies to promote private sector development (deterioration in regulatory 
quality). The portfolio flows are, in general, less sensitive to the governance measures perhaps, 
due to their short-term nature. The regulatory measure is positively related to the bond market 
flows and the rule of law encourages overall portfolio inflows by almost eight-folds. 
Consistent with contemporary development philosophies, our empirical evidence points 
clearly to the dire need for emerging market authorities to focus on making improvements to 
their legal and institutional framework and to keep corruption at bay in order to attract the 
international capital flows that are necessary for financial developments. 
Consistent with the literature, trade (economic) openness is significantly related to 
capital flows. However, it only promotes FDI, not bank flows. Interestingly, all three forms of 
portfolio flows show negative associations. This is somewhat unexpected.  
We also find that financial market development (proxied by SMCAP) has a significant 
positive effect on portfolio equity flows, and national income of recipient country (LOGINC) 
on net loans from international banks and a relative measure of FDI flows (LFDIBOP)  
 
5.4 Robustness checks of capital flows estimations 
Table 4 reports the summary of the ratings variables from alternative estimations of 
Model (2). As in the case of Model (1) estimations, the qualitative results of Model (2) 
estimations reported in Table 3 remain robust to endogeneity and multicollinearity concerns. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
We investigated the role of sovereign credit ratings provided by Standard and Poor’s on 
various measures of financial market developments in emerging countries. We also examined 
the influence of the ratings on international capital flows to these markets. In general, we find 
that sovereign credit ratings together with various governance perspectives are critical 
determinants of financial development in different financial sectors within emerging markets.  
 We find long-term ratings (both foreign currency and local currency denominated) are 
most important for the development of financial sectors in emerging markets. We find that 
foreign currency long-term ratings provided the most important impetus for international 
capital inflows and as a consequence, domestic financial market development. All three forms 
of capital inflows (FDI, international banking and portfolio) significantly increased as foreign 
currency long-term ratings of emerging market sovereigns improved. Significant domestic 
bond market development is found to be positively associated with ratings improvements.  
Local currency long-term ratings show conflicting results for emerging markets’ 
financial development and capital flows. It stimulated the developments of domestic stock and 
banking sectors, but had detrimental impact on international capital flows. This is consistent 
with a view that many emerging market sovereigns provide safety nets for financial sectors 
(e.g. lenders of last resort in the banking sector and management of market stabilization funds 
in stock and bond markets) and an improvement in sovereigns’ domestic currency fiscal 
positions adds to market stability and hence stimulus to market growth. On the other hand, 
this would lessen the need for sovereigns to look to foreign currency capital inflows in 
financing domestic currency expenditures as domestic markets develop more domestic 
currency funds would be supplied. 
Another interesting result is the detrimental impact of short-term ratings in both 
foreign and domestic currency ratings. Improvements in short-term ratings, in general, deter 
international capital inflows and hamper domestic financial market developments. As short-
term ratings improve, sovereigns are lured away from the more expensive long-term financing 
alternatives. This weakens long-term markets, and to the extent that emerging markets’ lack 
 21 
of access to long-term sources of capital contributed to their exposure to hard currency 
liabilities and eventual financial crises, improvements in short-term ratings would be seen as 
potential detriments. The obvious implication of this finding is for emerging market policy 
makers to encourage the provision of public credit ratings for long-term debt denominated in 
both domestic and foreign currencies. 
 Thus, we make valuable contributions to the knowledge base of emerging market 
participants and national and global policy makers alike by providing new empirical evidence 
of the role of sovereign credit ratings (as a country risk measure) on the degrees of emerging 
market financial sector development and inward capital flows.  
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Table 1. Panel data estimations for financial sector development, 1995-2003 
The panel data specifications are shown below: 
∑∑
==
− +++++++=
q
m
m
tim
p
k
k
tiktiLCSTtiLCLTtiFCSTtiFCLT
j
tilag
j
ti WBGovEconCTRSLCSTLCLTFCSTFCLTFINDEVFINDEV
1
,
1
,,,,,1,, αααααααα  
(1) 
Where FINDEV are the financial market development measures for country i and year t (j = stock market, banking sector, bond market, see Appendix A for 
details on their proxies). The ratings variables are foreign currency ratings for long- and short-term sovereign debt issues (FCLT and FCST), and local currency 
sovereign debt for long (LCLT) and short-term (LCST). The control variables incorporate country-specific governance and fundamental aspects. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. P-values are shown in braces.  
 
  
STRDGDP STURNOV SMCAP PRIVCRED BANKCRED BLENDING PRIVBOND PUBBOND
Lag 0.3267 *** 0.4972 *** 0.1786 ** 0.8006 *** 0.7456 *** 0.1249 * 0.5251 *** 0.7819 ***
{0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0202} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0752} {0.0000} {0.0000} 
FCLT -0.7833 -13.0853 *** 0.9923 -0.2358 0.5482 -0.2316 1.0863 ** 1.1710 ***
{0.7678} {0.0037} {0.6367} {0.7167} {0.5269} {0.4438} {0.0248} {0.0094} 
FCST -1.2554 -5.1919 2.9846 1.0110 1.6602 0.1244 -1.5176 ** -1.2017
{0.7748} {0.4835} {0.4244} {0.2268} {0.2561} {0.8238} {0.0292} {0.1397} 
LCLT 2.9612 15.8229 *** 0.1403 0.8995 * -0.0243 0.7197 *** -0.5054 * -0.5994 *
{0.1699} {0.0000} {0.9363} {0.0787} {0.9732} {0.0096} {0.0914} {0.0673} 
LCST -13.8501 *** -4.4726 -11.8254 *** -0.2875 -2.9348 ** -1.0720 ** -1.2504 ** -1.0858
{0.0014} {0.5319} {0.0023} {0.6635} {0.0118} {0.0379} {0.0103} {0.1285} 
GROWTH 0.9280 ** 1.0206 -0.3740 -0.4815 *** -0.4194 *** -0.0123 -0.2462 *** -0.2842 ***
{0.0382} {0.1767} {0.3170} {0.0000} {0.0021} {0.8161} {0.0000} {0.0000} 
INVEST 0.0135 0.0375 0.1423 ***
{0.6556} {0.4626} {0.0000} 
INFLA 0.0088 -0.1559 0.0078 0.0756 -0.0986
{0.9553} {0.5562} {0.6847} {0.0886} {0.0105} 
INTSPREAD -0.1135 * 0.0948 0.0210
{0.0657} {0.2144} {0.4227} 
LIQTOASSET -0.0290 -0.3102 *** -0.0653
{0.7083} {0.0088} {0.1071} 
GFCF -0.6146 ** -0.7585 **
{0.0135} {0.0163} 
LOGINC 13.1895 ** 11.0779
{0.0330} {0.1613} 
Stock Market Banking Sector Bond Market
Economic Control Variables
Ratings Variables
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Table 1. Panel data estimations for financial sector development, 1995-2003. - Continued 
 
ACCOUNT -2.8584 4.1994 -6.2858 -0.2328 0.4917 0.0686 0.0594 0.4940
{0.7564} {0.7904} {0.4018} {0.8908} {0.8661} {0.9537} {0.9434} {0.6885} 
POLSTA 7.3030 -1.2190 8.1564 -3.0106 ** -0.1617 -2.4901 ** -0.7347 -1.6355
{0.3872} {0.9323} {0.2258} {0.0463} {0.9511} {0.0251} {0.4064} {0.1847} 
GOVEFFECT 13.8797 11.1988 4.7500 6.7485 *** 6.7200 * 0.3826 0.3892 1.2325
{0.3074} {0.6349} {0.6430} {0.0013} {0.0591} {0.7876} {0.7622} {0.5161} 
REGQLTY 4.8019 -15.3062 10.0913 -1.8620 -6.3063 ** -0.0484 0.9911 -0.5678
{0.6060} {0.3320} {0.1625} {0.2301} {0.0154} {0.9602} {0.3550} {0.6956} 
RULELAW -25.2162 -15.3263 -25.8073 * -0.1782 2.7230 1.4866 -3.0955 * 6.0387 **
{0.1434} {0.5967} {0.0667} {0.9363} {0.4870} {0.3736} {0.0654} {0.0102} 
CORRUPTION 8.1488 -2.0830 2.3874 1.9750 2.4574 0.8577 2.9174 ** -5.4635 ***
{0.5983} {0.9378} {0.8492} {0.3462} {0.4966} {0.5623} {0.0323} {0.0079} 
R2-Adj 0.59 0.77 0.82 0.99 0.98 0.58 0.98 0.98
Levin, Lin and Chu's t test -9.4675 *** -19.9823 *** -45.0520 *** -18.5898 *** -38.1365 *** -41.4532 *** -6.0712 *** -10.0360 ***
H0: Common Unit Root {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} 
ADF Fisher Chi-Sq test 148.9000 *** 160.5060 *** 156.0060 *** 147.1040 *** 211.6450 *** 104.7900 ** 78.6883 *** 73.2741 **
H0: Individual Unit Root {0.0003} {0.0001} {0.0003} {0.0010} {0.0000} {0.0457} {0.0003} {0.0109} 
Panel Unit Root tests
World Bank Governance Index
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Table 2: Robustness checks of financial sector development estimations 
The panel data specifications are shown below: 
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ,
1 1
p q
j j k m
i t lag i t FCLT i t FCST i t LCLT i t LCST i t k i t m i t
k m
FINDEV FINDEV FCLT FCST LCLT LCST EconCTRS WBGovα α α α α α α α− − − − −
= =
= + + + + + + +∑ ∑  
(1a) 
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1 1
p q
j j k m
i t lag i t Ratings i t k i t m i t
k m
FINDEV FINDEV Rating EconCTRS WBGovα α α α α−
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑  
(1b) 
Where Rating = {FCLT, FCST, LCLT and LCST} estimated individually and contemporaneously. And FINDEV are the financial market development measures for 
country i and year t (j = stock market, banking sector, bond market, see Appendix A for details on their proxies). The ratings variables are foreign currency ratings for 
long- and short-term sovereign debt issues (FCLT and FCST), and local currency sovereign debt for long (LCLT) and short-term (LCST). The control variables 
incorporate country-specific governance and fundamental aspects. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. P-values are shown in braces. 
  
 
STRDGDP STURNOV SMCAP PRIVCRED BANKCRED BLENDING PRIVBOND PUBBOND
FCLT(t-1) -0.7833 -16.3961 *** 0.0857 -0.9267 0.6264 0.0136 0.7572 * 0.9244 **
{0.7678} {0.0001} {0.9653} {0.1522} {0.4484} {0.9626} {0.0848} {0.0120} 
FCST(t-1) -1.2554 -9.4111 -0.8522 0.0594 0.6179 0.5116 -0.7373 -0.9775
{0.7748} {0.1500} {0.8054} {0.9381} {0.6449} {0.3406} {0.2157} {0.1624} 
LCLT(t-1) 2.9612 17.5799 *** 0.7857 1.7484 *** -0.0073 0.2190 -0.5000 * -0.5070
{0.1699} {0.0000} {0.6322} {0.0009} {0.9915} {0.4030} {0.0978} {0.1094} 
LCST(t-1) -13.8501 *** -1.4842 0.0404 -1.5396 ** -3.0242 *** -0.4024 -0.8786 * -0.3898
{0.0014} {0.8168} {0.9913} {0.0174} {0.0080} {0.4247} {0.0742} {0.5804} 
FCLT -0.4628 -1.8458 0.3424 0.9735 *** 0.0480 0.1235 -0.4417 ** 0.0772
{0.6996} {0.4154} {0.7229} {0.0002} {0.8514} {0.1557} {0.0155} {0.7448} 
FCST -1.2282 -4.8123 0.9512 1.6749 -0.1430 0.1354 -0.9832 *** -0.4263
{0.6585} {0.3507} {0.6883} {0.1296} {0.8302} {0.5897} {0.0028} {0.3598} 
LCLT -0.1862 3.5684 * -0.2370 0.9135 *** 0.3035 0.3869 *** -0.4928 *** -0.3794
{0.8730} {0.0811} {0.8017} {0.0000} {0.4332} {0.0037} {0.0063} {0.1033} 
LCST -10.3442 *** 3.8226 -8.4538 *** 0.7972 -2.0654 ** -0.0294 -1.2344 *** -1.1286 *
{0.0050} {0.5519} {0.0088} {0.1976} {0.0493} {0.9459} {0.0017} {0.0654} 
Model (1b) - Ratings variables estimated individually(b)
Stock Market Banking Sector Bond Market
Model (1a) -One period lag of ratings variables
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Table 3. Panel regression estimations for capital flows 
The panel data specifications are shown below: 
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(2) 
Where CAPFLOW are the international capital flow measures for country i and year t (j = FDI, Bank, Portfolio flows see Appendix A for details on their proxies). The 
ratings variables are foreign currency ratings for long- and short-term sovereign debt issues (FCLT and FCST), and local currency sovereign debt for long (LCLT) and 
short-term (LCST). The control variables incorporate country-specific governance and fundamental aspects. *, ** and ***, denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively. Numbers in braces are p-values.  
 
 
FDIGDP LFDIBOP NETASSET NETLOAN PORTBOND PORTEQTY PORTEXC
Lag 0.1302 ** 0.2961 *** 0.9304 *** 0.8501 *** 0.1409 ** 0.1626 ** 0.2153 ***
{0.0232} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0334} {0.0112} {0.0004} 
FCLT 0.0768 0.6703 ** 2.9272 *** 1.4850 ** 0.0856 0.1044 1.4746 **
{0.7351} {0.0459} {0.0008} {0.0498} {0.6007} {0.4089} {0.0157} 
FCST -0.8219 * -1.8983 *** -0.4653 -0.3296 0.4124 -0.3556 1.2919
{0.0679} {0.0043} {0.7711} {0.8134} {0.2171} {0.1710} {0.2427} 
LCLT 0.2646 0.1656 -1.6669 ** -0.5559 0.0827 -0.2577 ** -1.8054 ***
{0.1781} {0.5631} {0.0152} {0.3525} {0.5798} {0.0254} {0.0004} 
LCST -0.7058 * -0.9563 0.2011 -0.5424 0.1750 0.4576 * 0.0608
{0.0933} {0.1190} {0.8656} {0.6024} {0.5691} {0.0572} {0.9449} 
TRADE 0.0313 * -0.0008 -0.0858 *** -0.0465 *** -0.0067 -0.0191 ** -0.1225 ***
{0.0530} {0.9727} {0.0000} {0.0054} {0.5839} {0.0476} {0.0045} 
LOGINC 2.0730 3.2243 * 8.4344 ** 7.2440 ** 0.0301 0.0465 * 0.1863 *
{0.1032} {0.0830} {0.0230} {0.0239} {0.3499} {0.0671} {0.0906} 
SMCAPLISTED 0.0055 0.0119 -0.0442 ** -0.0596 *** -0.0037 0.0294 *** 0.0252
{0.4082} {0.2217} {0.0150} {0.0002} {0.5852} {0.0000} {0.1487} 
PRIVCRED -0.0288 -0.0341
{0.4109} {0.2614} 
BANKCRED 0.0165 -0.0081 -0.0628 *
{0.1456} {0.3525} {0.0700} 
FDI Flows Bank Flows Portfolio Flows
Ratings Variables
Economic Control Variables
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Table 3. Panel regression estimations for capital flows – Continued 
 
ACCOUNT -1.2233 -2.8013 ** 3.8760 ** 3.6432 *** -0.4695 0.6971 -3.7610
{0.1579} {0.0271} {0.0161} {0.0095} {0.4501} {0.1477} {0.1076} 
POLSTA 0.1007 0.9172 -0.9307 -2.1304 -1.0821 * -0.7653 -1.1915
{0.9027} {0.4497} {0.5537} {0.1228} {0.0827} {0.1128} {0.5929} 
GOVEFFECT -3.0115 *** -4.6330 *** 5.5159 * 3.8551 -0.9213 -0.1801 -1.0753
{0.0083} {0.0062} {0.0874} {0.1701} {0.2926} {0.7887} {0.7007} 
REGQLTY 0.7971 0.6726 -4.1712 ** -3.7991 ** 1.4338 ** -0.0391 0.9379
{0.3118} {0.5577} {0.0474} {0.0386} {0.0135} {0.9301} {0.6558} 
RULELAW 4.6132 *** 4.8018 ** -4.3672 -0.1687 1.3218 1.0347 7.8792 **
{0.0018} {0.0258} {0.2176} {0.9567} {0.2304} {0.2167} {0.0242} 
CORRUPTION 0.4886 3.0868 * -0.0109 -1.2594 -0.4419 -0.4482 0.2543
{0.6873} {0.0830} {0.9975} {0.6736} {0.6188} {0.5142} {0.9278} 
R2-Adj 0.54 0.73 0.86 0.84 0.30 0.38 0.27
Levin, Lin and Chu's t test -16.5035 *** -14.2242 *** -11.4484 *** -15.3263 *** -16.4001 *** -33.9871 *** -38.9918 ***
H0: Common Unit Root {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} 
ADF Fisher Chi-Sq test 146.335 *** 139.748 *** 162.817 *** 129.459 ** 142.474 *** 203.755 *** 203.129 ***
H0: Individual Unit Root {0.0018} {0.0054} {0.0001} {0.0345} {0.0000} {0.0000} {0.0000} 
World Bank Governance Index
Panel Unit Root tests
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Table 4: Robustness checks of capital flows estimations 
The panel data specifications are shown below: 
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ,
1 1
p q
j j k m
i t lag i t FCLT i t FCST i t LCLT i t LCST i t k i t m i t
k m
CAPFLOW CAPFLOW FCLT FCST LCLT LCST EconCTRS WBGovα α α α α α α α
− − − − −
= =
= + + + + + + +∑ ∑  
(2a) 
, , 1 , , ,
1 1
p q
j j k m
i t lag i t Ratings i t k i t m i t
k m
CAPFLOW CAPFLOW Rating EconCTRS WBGovα α α α α
−
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑  
(2b) 
Where Rating = {FCLT, FCST, LCLT and LCST} estimated individually and contemporaneously. And CAPFLOW are the international capital flow measures for 
country i and year t (j = FDI, Bank, Portfolio flows see Appendix A for details on their proxies). The ratings variables are foreign currency ratings for long- and short-
term sovereign debt issues (FCLT and FCST), and local currency sovereign debt for long (LCLT) and short-term (LCST). The control variables incorporate country-
specific governance and fundamental aspects. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. P-values are shown in braces.  
 
 
FDIGDP LFDIBOP NETASSET NETLOAN PORTBOND PORTEQTY PORTEXC
FCLT(t-1) 0.2972 0.7672 ** 2.4740 *** 1.3282 * 0.1895 -0.1008 1.4012 **
{0.1793} {0.0203} {0.0032} {0.0660} {0.2376} {0.4197} {0.0210} 
FCST(t-1) -0.7671 * -1.6930 *** -0.4313 -0.6445 0.2251 -0.0289 0.3835
{0.0787} {0.0097} {0.7775} {0.6265} {0.4883} {0.9123} {0.7122} 
LCLT(t-1) -0.0446 -0.2778 -1.4855 ** -0.4575 0.0051 -0.2005 -1.5300 ***
{0.8148} {0.3187} {0.0211} {0.4112} {0.9705} {0.0610} {0.0017} 
LCST(t-1) -0.5237 -0.2919 0.1151 -0.7118 0.1013 0.3538 * -0.0732
{0.2156} {0.6362} {0.9162} {0.4552} {0.7321} {0.1235} {0.9351} 
FCLT -0.0600 0.0831 1.7721 *** 1.4338 *** 0.0060 0.0444 0.3691
{0.6237} {0.6507} {0.0028} {0.0089} {0.9121} {0.3520} {0.2442} 
FCST -0.4947 -0.8057 * 1.6931 1.5097 0.0654 -0.0390 0.0204
{0.1007} {0.0732} {0.2507} {0.2642} {0.6717} {0.7728} {0.9661} 
LCLT 0.0077 0.0470 1.1189 ** 0.7261 -0.0327 -0.1628 *** -0.5006 *
{0.9470} {0.7822} {0.0402} {0.1581} {0.4297} {0.0076} {0.0868} 
LCST -0.4404 -0.6159 1.9065 1.6640 -0.0695 -0.0403 -0.7787
{0.1785} {0.2004} {0.1579} {0.1779} {0.5349} {0.8303} {0.3065} 
Model (2b) - Ratings variables estimated individually
Model (2a) - One period lag of ratings variables
FDI Flows Bank Flows Portfolio Flows
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Appendix A 
 
Linear transformation of S&P's sovereign credit ratings 
    
Long-term Ratings Short-term Ratings 
Rating Conversion Rating Conversion 
Investable grades 
AAA 20 A-1+ 6 
AA+ 19 A-1 5 
AA 18 A-2 4 
AA- 17 A-3 3 
A+ 16    
A 15    
A- 14    
BBB+ 13    
BBB 12    
BBB- 11     
Speculative grades 
BB+ 10    
BB 9 B 2 
BB- 8 C 1 
B+ 7 D/SD 0 
B 6    
B- 5    
CCC+ 4    
CCC 3    
CCC- 2    
CC 1    
D/SD 0     
Outlook for Long-term Ratings    
Outlook Conversion    
Credit Watch - Positive 0.5    
Positive 0.25    
Stable 0    
Negative -0.25    
Credit Watch - Negative -0.5     
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Appendix B List of Emerging Market Countries studied 
 
Asia Africa/Middle East Europe Latin America 
China Egypt Bulgaria Argentina 
Hong Kong Israel Croatia Bolivia 
India Jordan Cyprus Brazil 
Indonesia Kuwait Czech Republic Chile 
Kazahkstan Lebanon Estonia Colombia 
Korea Oman Greece Dominican Republic 
Malaysia South Africa Hungary Ecuador 
Pakistan  Latvia El Salvador 
Philippines  Lithuania Guatemala 
Singapore  Malta Mexico 
Thailand  Poland Panama 
  Portugal Paraguay 
  Romania Peru 
  Russia Uruguay 
  Slovak Republic Venezuela 
  Spain  
  Turkey  
  Ukraine  
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Appendix C:  Variable Definitions and Data definitions 
Financial Sector Development measures 
Stock Market  
STRDGDP Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) 
STURNOV Stocks traded, turnover ratio (%) 
SMCAP Market capitalization of listed companies at the end of year (% of GDP) 
Banking Sector  
PRIVCRED Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (in %) 
BANKCRED Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) 
BLENDING Bank and trade-related lending (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US$ billion)   
Debt Market  
PRIVBOND Private bond market capitalization to GDP (in %) 
PUBBOND Public bond market capitalization to GDP (in %) 
Sovereign credit ratings type 
FCLT Sovereign credit rating - Foreign currency Long-term rating 
FCST Sovereign credit rating - Foreign currency Short-term rating 
LCLT Sovereign credit rating - Local currency Long-term rating 
LCST Sovereign credit rating - Local currency Short-term rating 
Economic control variables 
Own_Lag One-year lag of financial sector development  
GROWTH GDP growth (annual %) 
INVEST S&P/IFC investable index (annual % change) 
INFLA Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
INTSPREAD Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate) 
LIQTOASSET Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio  
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 
LOGINC Natural log of national income using GDP per capita 
TRADE Total trade as % GDP 
Capital Flows  
NETASSET Total assets minus total liabilities of BIS reporting banks against individual countries (US$ billion) 
NETLOAN Total loan minus total deposits from BIS reporting banks against individual countries (US$ billion) 
FDIGDP Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
FDIBOP Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$ billion)  
PORTBOND Portfolio investment, bonds (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US$ billion)   
PORTEQTY Portfolio investment, equity (DRS, current US$ billion)   
PORTEXC Portfolio investment, excluding Liabilities constituting foreign authorities’ reserves (BoP, current US$ billion) 
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World Bank Aggregate Governance Indicators – ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 
Account  Voice and Accountability 
Polsta Political Stability 
Goveffect Government Effectiveness 
Regqlty Regulatory Quality 
Rulelaw Rule of Law 
Corruption Control of Corruption 
 
